EXHIBIT 14

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2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
3	AT SEATTLE
4	
	IN RE VALVE ANTITRUST LITIGATION
5	
6	Case No. 2:21-cv-00563-JCC
7	
8	April 18, 2024
_	9:08 a.m.
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10	*** HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY ***
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13	DEDOCTATON OF CHEVEN CCUMADAD
14	DEPOSITION of STEVEN SCHWARTZ, pursuant to Notice, held at the offices of
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16	LLP, 437 Madison Avenue, New York, New
17	York before Wayne Hock, a Notary Public of
18	the State of New York.
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Page 35 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 used together. 3 0. Would a mouse and a computer be examples of that? 4 5 Probably, although the link 6 between a mouse and a computer is probably 7 not as strong as they once were. 8 certainly they were surely complements at 9 one time. Whether they are now, because 10 of track pads like on that laptop, is not 11 as clear. 12 If the price of a good goes up, 13 does the demand for the complement good go 14 down? 15 Α. I would expect ordinarily if A 16 and B are complements, if the price of A 17 goes up, the quantity demanded of B goes 18 down. 19 Do the prices of games on other 20 stores affect the prices on Steam? 21 In some ways, that's why we're 22 all here. 23 Because there are parity 24 requirements, price differences on a given 25 game between stores, as I understand it,

Page 36 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 do not ordinarily persist. Yeah, I'll leave it at that. 3 4 Have you looked into that 5 question? To the extent that that issue is 6 **A**. 7 discussed in the documents and in the 8 other materials in the record of the case, 9 yes. I have not done at this point a 10 pricing study or anything of that sort. 11 By pricing study, you mean you 0. 12 haven't studied the prices on Steam for 13 games as compared to the prices on other 14 platforms? 15 Not in any systematic way, no, **A** . 16 not at this point. 17 Do prices on -- of games on 0. 18 consoles affect prices on Steam? 19 Α. I've not seen any evidence that, 20 when developers set prices for games on 21 consoles, that they are affected in any 22 systematic way by prices of those same 23 games on Steam or vice versa. 24 Q. Did you look into the question? 25 I have looked at information in Α.

Page 88 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 hundred seventy-five and three hundred 3 seventy-six of your report. 4 Α. I'm there. I'm sorry. 5 0. Now, in figure six of three hundred seventy-five, you have a list of 6 7 publishers. And those publishers -- tell 8 me, what is that list of publishers, in 9 your view? 10 So to understand figure six, you **A** . 11 need to understand the context. This is 12 part of an analysis of the but-for market 13 share, section 8.3.4 of my report 14 beginning at paragraph three hundred 15 seventy. And figure six represents the 16 assessment of what the market shares were 17 for this set of publishers during the period 2008 to 2012 for their games sold 18 19 on Steam, and that includes Valve. 20 And does it include -- so in 0. 21 your opinion, these publishers would be 22 selling -- would create platforms and in 23 the but-for world they would be selling 24 games, both first party and third party? 25 So I would -- I would refer you **A**.

Page 89 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 to the discussion that begins at paragraph 3 three hundred seventy-two. Three hundred 4 seventy-two points out that multiple 5 publishers -- and makes the point that those are generally those with several 6 7 popular titles or game franchises -- tried 8 to make the transition from being a 9 developer and publisher to being a 10 distributor, and I identify some of the 11 ones that have tried to do that. 12 Paragraph three hundred 13 seventy-three sets out the premise of the 14 but-for world which is that -- and I'll 15 read it -- "the newly entering or existing 16 fringe platforms would have been able to 17 better attract third party PC content by 18 offering publishers a greater share of 19 transaction value so that publishers could 20 offer their games at lower prices on these 21 platforms. These lower prices would in 22 turn help to attract gamers to the 23 platform. But for Valve's alleged 24 anticompetitive conduct, publishers that 25 continued to operate their distribution

Page 90 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 platforms would likely have garnered a 3 larger share of the market, and it's 4 likely that at least some of the 5 publishers that stopped operating their 6 distribution platforms would have 7 continued to operate their platforms. 8 Therefore, the but-for world would also include publishers that operate or 9 10 previously operated PC game distribution 11 platforms as competitors to Steam". 12 Am I right that you use the 13 market shares that you derive here as an 14 input to your damages model? 15 **A** . The Steam market share, yes. 16 Not an output of the damages 0. 17 model but an input to the damages model? 18 **A** . It's an input to the damages 19 model. 20 So where did you come up with 0. 21 the idea of using publishers' share of 22 their own games sold on Steam between 2008 23 and 2012 as a way of predicting what 24 Steam's market share would be in the 25 but-for world between 2017 and today?

Page 91 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 **A** . Unfortunately, Valve never gave 3 us the natural experiment by operating in 4 a but-for world that was free of the 5 alleged anticompetitive behavior. So we 6 needed to develop a reasonable proxy for 7 what that might have looked like, and 8 recognizing that the third-party 9 publishers were likely to have come as 10 Valve did, as Steam did from somebody who 11 is a game developer and a first-party 12 publisher, the best evidence we had of the 13 relative strength of those various 14 alternative platforms and more importantly 15 where Valve would have resided would be to 16 look at the period when all of these 17 publishers were listed games on Steam and 18 before they decided to go and operate 19 their own distribution platform. And it 20 was the best and most reasonable proxy 21 that was available to us given that Valve 22 never allowed us to have a clean period 23 absent the behavior that's at issue here 24 that's being challenged where we could 25 observe what -- what those but-for market

Page 92 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 shares might have looked like. 3 Are you aware of any support in 0. 4 the peer-reviewed literature for using 5 publishers' shares of their own games on somebody else's platform as a proxy for 6 7 what their market share would be in the 8 but-for world of selling third-party 9 games? 10 **A** . Well, generally speaking, the 11 peer-reviewed literature doesn't focus on 12 issues like this in litigation. It's 13 generally not a subject that academics are 14 interested in for their academic writing. 15 But it is within the literature that 16 focuses on damages calculations. The use 17 of benchmarks and proxies is a valid and reliable method, that's what this is, and 18 19 I believe this is a valid and reliable 20 benchmark and proxy, so I think it's a 21 perfectly appropriate and reasonable way 22 to proceed. 23 Has the concept of using sales 0. 24 on a video game third-party platform, 25 Steam here, ever been used before as a

Page 93 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 proxy for what a video game company might 3 sell by way of third-party games ten years 4 down the road? 5 MR. LERAY: I object to form. THE WITNESS: I am not aware of 6 7 a similar circumstance in a litigation 8 setting where that would have been an 9 option, so I can't say for sure that it hasn't happened. I'm just not 10 11 aware of it. But I think this is a 12 very straightforward use of proxies, 13 benchmarks, whatever you want to call 14 them, and that has been used obviously 15 in many contexts many times before. 16 So your opinion is that Steam's Q. 17 market share in 2017 would be 18 percent? 19 My opinion is that, in a but-for 20 world that was free of the PMFN in which 21 other platforms were free to compete on 22 the merits both on the basis of price and 23 content where there was no limit to that 24 competition as a result of Valve's 25 policies and competition on the merits was

Page 94 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 allowed to occur, that the but-for market 3 share that Steam would realize is 4 approximately percent, 5 percent. That is the best estimate of what would be the but-for outcome in a 6 7 market unencumbered by Valve's behavior 8 that's at issue in this case. 9 Ο. But your basis for that 10 percent is figure six; correct? 11 Figure six displays what the 12 market share is based on the analysis that 13 I described in the report. 14 And you believe that in the 15 but-for world, Steam's market share would 16 have been the same between 2017 and 2024; 17 correct? I think the damages period right 18 19 now is through 2021, but I believe that 20 that is the best and most reasonable 21 estimate of what Steam's market share 22 would be in the but-for world and is 23 appropriate to use it as I've done for 24 purposes of calculating damages. It's all 25 common evidence, it's all the same

Page 99 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 Q. Let's go on for another five or 3 ten minutes, if that's okay. Do you have a method to predict 4 5 which successful game developers will, in 6 your view, create a successful platform in 7 the but-for world and which ones won't? 8 No, and I don't need to. What I Α. 9 need to know is that there is going to be 10 increased competition, and as a result of 11 that increased competition from these 12 additional third-party distribution 13 platforms, Valve will be compelled by 14 competitive pressure to compete on price 15 with developers and will lower the 16 commission rate, and vault of the lower 17 commission rate, game prices will be 18 reduced and both consumers and developers 19 will benefit and there will be robust 20 competition. 21 Do you believe that in the 22 but-for world, will operate a platform 23 with a market share of percent 24 between 2017 and 2021? 25 I don't know and I don't need to **A**.

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2
    know. It doesn't -- what I need to know
3
    is what the but-for -- approximate but-for
4
    market share is for Valve who comprises
5
    the remaining roughly
                                     percent
    of the market and how that's distributed
6
7
    across the various platforms is not an
8
    essential element of my analysis. What is
9
    important is to get an estimate of the
10
    approximate size of Valve within the
11
    marketplace and understand that the
12
    elimination of the PMFN is going to lead
13
    to entry, effective entry, competition,
14
    and a greater number of platforms in the
15
    marketplace. But it's not necessary for
16
    me to know who those are and what each
17
    specific platform's share would be.
18
        Q.
              So you're saying, for example,
19
          share could be higher than
    that
20
    percent and
                            share could be
21
    lower than
                percent?
22
        A .
              What I'm saying is that there
23
    will be other platforms that will comprise
24
    the
         percent of the rest of the
25
    market. Whether it is comprised of
```

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Page 101
 1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
 2
3
                             only, whether it
                and
4
    will be some subset of this group plus
5
    others who may have entered and failed or
    thought about entering and chose not to is
6
7
    not what is important. What is important
8
    is the estimate of the approximately
9
    percent market share. That's what flows
10
    through to the damages analysis.
11
              Will
                             market share be
        0.
12
                  percent in the but-for
    approximately
13
    world?
14
              I'll give you the same answer
15
    that I just gave: I don't know and it
16
    doesn't matter. What matters is the
17
    percent for Valve. How the remaining
18
    percent is distributed among competing
19
    platforms is not something that I need to
20
    determine, it's not necessary as a part of
21
    my analysis for the damages analysis, so
22
    it's not something that I need to analyze
23
    or predict.
24
              How are you able to predict
        Q.
25
    Valve's share at percent when you're
```

Page 102 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 not able to predict share at 3 percent? Because what I'm saying is that, 4 A. 5 within this more competitive market, 6 Valve's share will be about 7 percent, percent. How the remaining share is divided up and among 8 9 whom isn't important. I don't need to 10 know that for my damages analysis. What I 11 need to know for my damages analysis is 12 what Valve's but-for share would be. Who 13 comprises or takes up the remaining 14 percent doesn't matter for purposes of the 15 damages calculation. 16 But the basis for your 17 estimating the market share of every one 18 of these companies on figure six is the 19 Steam revenue that those companies 20 generated that's listed in figure six; 21 correct? 22 A. Yes. 23 So your basis for predicting the 0. 24 revenue share in column three of figure 25 six is exactly the same for Valve as it is

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1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    for every other company on that list;
3
    correct?
4
              I'm sorry, repeat that for me?
5
    I'm not sure I understood that.
6
        Q.
              Yes.
7
              The revenue shares that you
8
    derive in figure six in the right-hand
9
    column, Valve, for
10
    those are all simply derived by comparing
11
    the Steam revenue that's listed in the
12
    Steam revenue chart on figure six;
13
    correct?
14
              It is based on the revenue from
        A .
15
    the Steam platform on the sale of the
16
    games during this period and -- during
17
    this five-year period, and that's the best
18
    predictor we have for what Valve's market
19
    share would be in a but-for world. That's
20
    the only parameter I need for the damages
21
    analysis.
22
              The specifics about how the
23
    remaining share is divided up in the
24
    but-for world is not something that I need
25
    for my damages analysis or any other part
```

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Page 104
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    of my analysis.
3
              Your basis for thinking that
        0.
4
    Steam will have a percent revenue
5
    share in the but-for world is because its
    sales on figure six between January, 2008
6
    and December, 2012 was
7
                                    [sic]
8
      ; correct?
9
        A .
10
11
        Q.
              I'm sorry.
12
              Let me rephrase that.
13
              Your basis for thinking that
14
    Steam's revenue share of percent will
15
    be because Valve's sales of its own games
16
    on Steam between January, 2008 and
17
    December, 2012 were
                        ; correct?
18
              THE WITNESS: Read that one back
19
        to me again, please.
20
              (Whereupon the requested portion
21
        was read back by the reporter)
22
              THE WITNESS: I would agree
23
        that's how the calculation is done.
24
              Your basis for thinking that
        Q.
25
                       percent is because
             share of
```

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Page 105
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    it sold
             worth of games, its
3
    own games, on Steam between January, 2008
4
    and December, 2012; correct?
5
        A.
              That is the revenue share for
           during that period. That
6
7
    parameter does not fit in -- does not
8
    implicate my damages analysis.
9
        Q.
              I realize it does not implicate
10
    your damages analysis.
11
              But would you agree with me that
12
    your basis for determining the revenue
13
    shares of each one of the companies on the
14
    list of figure six is exactly the same?
15
        A .
              I'm sorry, I don't understand
16
    that question.
17
              Can you try it again?
18
        Q.
              Yes.
19
              You used the same method to
20
    derive a revenue share for every one of
21
    the company that's listed on figure six;
22
    correct?
23
              I would agree the calculation is
        A .
24
    the same for each of these.
25
              And the method that produced the
        Q.
```

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 numbers and the calculation is the same
 for each of them; correct?
 - A. I would agree that the revenue shares are all calculated by division and the division formula is the same for each of the publishers.
 - Q. And because you used the same method and the same calculations for derives each one of the revenue shares that's listed in figure six, would you agree with me that you can't be any more certain of any one than the other in terms of what will prevail in the but-for world?
 - question and the answer is no. I think had I -- it would have been perfectly adequate for purposes of my analysis if, in figure six, I had two rows, Valve and other, and a footnote that said other is comprised of the sales of these other seven publishers because what I am confident of is that the percent is accurate and that it is a reasonable proxy for what Valve would obtain as its market

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1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    share in a but-for world where it no
3
    longer imposes the PMFN, and that the
4
    remaining share would be taken up by other
5
    third-party distributors. Whether it is
    these entities or others doesn't matter.
6
7
    I don't need to specify who all the other
8
    competitors are.
9
        Q.
              Would you agree with me --
10
              MR. LERAY: Charles, hold on, the
11
        witness asked for a break like ten
12
        minutes ago.
13
              MR. CASPER: Could I ask one more
14
        question?
15
              MR. LERAY: Sure.
16
        Q.
           Would you agree that the
17
    reasonableness of your basis for believing
18
    that Steam will have a percent
19
    revenue share in the but-for world is
20
    exactly the same as your basis for
21
    believing that
                          will have a
22
    percent revenue share in the but-for
23
    world?
24
        A .
              In the but-for world, these
25
    other seven competitors may or may not be
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Page 108
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    competing. What I know is that the
3
    remaining competitors, whether it is these
4
    seven or these seven joined by others or
5
    some number lower than that, will have
     percent. How that will be
6
7
    distributed in the end does not matter.
8
    What matters substantively is that Valve
9
    will have roughly percent of the
                  percent of the market.
10
    market,
11
        Q. Could you please answer the same
12
    question I asked, which is: Is your basis
13
    for believing that percent will be
14
    Steam's revenue share in the but-for world
15
    exactly the same as your basis for
16
    believing that percent will be
17
              revenue share in the but-for
18
    world?
19
              MR. LERAY: Objection. You said
20
        one more question. He already
21
        answered it. You just repeated the
22
        question again.
23
              MR. CASPER: I didn't get an
24
        answer, so I'd like the witness to
25
        answer this question.
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Page 109
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
              THE WITNESS: I mean, I'm not
3
        sure how to answer it in any way than
        I did.
4
5
              Let me try this and see if this
        makes my point clearer.
6
7
              I don't know nor do I need to
8
        know what
                           or
9
                 or
                                or
                                      or
10
                             do in the but-for
11
        world.
                I don't need to know whether
12
        any of them would have had some form
13
        of distribution. All I need to know
14
        is that all the remaining competitors
15
        would have about
                                percent of
16
                     . How that's
        the market,
17
        allocated I don't know. I do know
18
        that Valve exists in the but-for
19
        world. I do know that, without the
20
        PMFN, Valve would continue to operate
21
        as a platform. And so knowing that, I
        have a reasonable basis for all the
22
23
        reasons that I explained in this
24
        section of my report to use this as a
25
        conservative proxy for what its
```

Page 110 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 revenue share would be. 3 MR. CASPER: Let's take a break. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 4 5 11:56 a.m., and we're going off the 6 record. 7 (Whereupon a break was taken) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 8 9 12:19 p.m., and we're back on the 10 record. 11 MR. CASPER: Could we mark tab 12 seventeen as Exhibit 4, please. 13 (Whereupon, a document entitled 14 Top Publishers By Net Sales on Steam 15 was marked Schwartz Exhibit 4 16 for identification.) 17 Dr. Schwartz, I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit 4. And it's 18 19 a chart that we prepared using your data 20 of the top publishers by net sales on 21 Steam between January, 2008 and December, 22 2012. And it's the same data that you use 23 in figure six on page two hundred five of 24 your report that we were just talking

about.

Page 179 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 whether it is an exercise of market power to compel people to play the game on the 3 Internet as opposed to giving them the 4 5 option to make the choice to do so or not. 6 That's the exercise of market power. 7 Again, whether that is 8 anticompetitive is a question that I have 9 not analyzed, but it is surely an exercise 10 of market power. 11 So is it your testimony that 12 companies today who sell a product that 13 requires an Internet connection are 14 exhibiting market power? 15 If they sell a product that 16 requires an Internet connection and don't 17 allow people who have purchased an earlier 18 version of that product that does not 19 require an Internet connection to 20 nonetheless use the Internet connection, 21 that would be an exercise of market power. 22 Q. Okay. 23 What's the World Opponent 24 Network? 25 I'm sorry?

A.

Page 180 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 Q. What is the World Opponent Network, if you know? 3 4 **A** . I don't know. 5 MR. LERAY: We have been going a 6 little over an hour. 7 THE WITNESS: I mean, if we're 8 at a good stopping point, we can stop. 9 If you want to finish the line, we can 10 do that, too. 11 MR. CASPER: If you'd like to 12 take a break now, it would be fine. 13 THE WITNESS: If we don't take a 14 break now, are you going to be in a 15 better stopping point in ten minutes? 16 MR. CASPER: This is fine. 17 THE WITNESS: Okay. 18 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 19 2:44 p.m., and we are going off the 20 record. 21 (Whereupon a break was taken) 22 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 23 3:04 p.m., and we're back on the 24 record. 25 0. Good afternoon again, Dr.

Page 187 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO is activated and the user begins to play the game on Steam. So you reported in your report Q. at a couple of different places that the effective revenue share of games for certain periods of time was percent and then for another period of time, it was percent, taking into account the lower revenue tiers that Valve introduced in 2018. Is that right? **A** . If you're thinking of the same thing I'm thinking of, yes, the lower effective rate would reflect the tiering that went into effect in 2018. When you calculated those effective revenue shares for developers selling a game on Steam, did you take Steam keys into account?

- A. No, because that wasn't a transaction that occurred on Steam.
- Q. So you ignored the revenue that the developers get when they sell their Steam keys in calculating what percent of

1

2

3

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19

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23

24

Page 188 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 their revenue they paid to Valve as 3 revenue share? 4 I didn't ignore it. It's part **A** . 5 of a different question. The question on the effective rate is what's the effective 6 7 rate that publishers paid on transactions 8 that occurred on Steam. The question 9 you're I think getting at is an entirely 10 different, and I'm not sure whether it's a 11 relevant question. 12 If a publisher sells half of 13 their games on Steam and the other half by 14 using Steam keys, what is that publisher's 15 effective revenue share? 16 MR. LERAY: I object to form. 17 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure that 18 that's a meaningful metric because the 19 revenue share is -- by the term itself 20 the way the revenue is shared when a 21 transaction takes place on Steam. So 22 their revenue share is one hundred 23 percent for Steam keys and a 30/70 24 split for transactions that occur on 25 Steam.

- S. Schwartz HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AEO
- Q. And if you were to look at it from the point of view of the publisher and how much money they get to keep from games they sell that are ultimately played on Steam, the publisher gets more money in their pocket if they sell more Steam keys than if they sell fewer Steam keys, correct, all else being equal?
 - A. If I'm understanding what you're asking, I think it's a tautology. If they sell a Steam key, they get to keep all of the revenue. If they sell on Steam directly, they keep seventy percent of the revenue. And I would agree with you a hundred percent is more than seventy percent.
 - Q. And so if you look at effective revenue share from that perspective, that is how much the developer gets to keep of the money that they get for selling the game, Steam keys changes the effective revenue share; doesn't it?

 MR. LERAY: I object to form.
 - THE WITNESS: So I think I

S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO understand what you're asking.

As the mix of sales changes
between sales on Steam and sales
through Steam keys, the revenue to the
publisher changes. I would certainly
agree with that.

- Q. So when you're doing your but-for world calculations, what assumptions do you make of the availability and use of Steam keys in the but-for world?
- A. I have assumed that Valve will continue to make Steam keys available in the but-for world, but I've not made any assumptions about the extent to which Steam keys will be made available or whether any of the policies around Steam keys will change other than the elimination of the price parity requirement with respect to Steam keys.
- Q. So as far as you're concerned, in the but-for world, Valve might change its policies regarding Steam keys?
 - A. In the but-for world, they would

S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO necessarily have to change their policy with respect to price parity because, in the but-for world, there's no PMFN.

Whether they change other policies with respect to Steam keys, including where they can be utilized, with respect to which outlets, how many they issue, they might change their policies.

There's no way to know, nor does it matter for purposes of my analysis.

Q. So throughout your report you say that the -- what you call the PMFN caused Steam to be more successful than it otherwise would have been.

Is that a fair statement from your report?

A. I -- I would say it a bit differently. I would say that, because of Steam's monopoly power, it's able to operate under a PMFN that controls -- that applies to both content and price. As a result of the implementation of that PMFN, Steam creates barriers to competitive entry and effect of competition on the

- S. Schwartz HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AEO its first mover advantage and challenge whatever network effects it has. That's undeniable. If I can't compete on price and I can't compete on content differentiation, I have no means by which, as a competitor, can effectively compete with Steam. My hands are tied behind my So by taking away from the mechanisms by which effective entry and effective competition from those entrants would occur, I have artificially protected myself from whatever challenges they present. That's undeniable.
 - Q. So in order for the so-called PMFN to work, the developers -- the publishers have to know about it; right?
 - A. In order for the PMFN to work, there have to be enough publishers to know about it that you have substantial compliance with it such that effective entry is precluded on the part of a competing platform.
- Q. And what evidence -- I've read
 your report and I've seen a list of

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Page 198 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 e-mails that were written by Valve 3 employees and by others. We of course 4 have the Steam key rules and guidelines on 5 the so-called price parity side. What evidence do you have that 6 you considered that those mechanisms made 7 8 developers and publishers aware of the 9 so-called PMFN? 10 MR. LERAY: I object to form. 11 Is this in addition to what's in 12 his report? 13 THE WITNESS: I was going to 14 say, since I'm sure you've read my 15 report, you know that there's 16 substantial discussion of that in the 17 report, including the fact that there 18 are some examples, and they are just 19 examples, they by no means exhaust the 20 universe, of large publishers who are 21 called on the carpet for violating 22 price or content parity requirements 23 with and without Steam keys, sometimes 24 resulting in games being delisted. 25 And when there is the show of force,

Page 199 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 to borrow a probably not so great 3 metaphor right now, there is 4 information conveyed to publishers 5 generally that if a really large 6 developer can be subject to a price 7 parity requirement and be punished in 8 a serious way for a price parity 9 requirement violation then, number 10 one, it says that it's something that 11 Steam is serious about. 12 Number two, it says it's 13 something that I need to comply with. 14 And there is ample evidence that 15 -- I didn't need to cite it in the 16 report, I could have, of developers 17 talking to one another about it and 18 communicating that there are these 19 policies. And since the requirement 20 is that there be substantial 21 compliance and not one hundred percent 22 knowledge across the board, that's 23 really all you need to make the PMFN a 24 binding constraint on the behavior of 25 developers when setting price or

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Page 200
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
        putting content into versions of
3
        games.
4
              Well, in the e-mails that are
        Q.
5
    cited in your report, how many publishers
6
    did those go to?
7
        A .
              I haven't counted.
8
        0.
              Could you count them on two
9
    hands?
10
        A .
              I don't know.
11
              Would you agree with me that
        0.
12
    it's a very small number?
13
        A .
              It wouldn't surprise me if it
14
    is. But the point is those are exemplars
15
    of what happens. Those don't exhaust the
16
    universe. And I think again I could have
17
    cited and perhaps will subsequently
18
    substantial evidence of general knowledge
19
    within the developer/publisher community
20
    of the requirement for price parity.
21
              Have you considered the
                    witnesses in this
22
    testimony from
23
    case that they don't know about price
24
    parity?
25
        A.
              I am aware of the testimony.
```

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Page 201
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    looked at least one piece of it today. I
3
    don't know what else you have in mind as
4
    I'm sitting here. I'm also aware of
5
    documents in which they explicitly
    acknowledge price parity. That's a piece
6
7
    of the body of evidence that I considered.
8
              How many publishers, roughly
        Q.
9
    speaking, sell games on Steam?
10
        A .
              I have the number somewhere in
11
    the report. It's a large number. I don't
12
    recall.
13
        Q.
              Up in the tens of thousands;
14
    correct?
15
              It's in the thousands for sure.
        A .
16
    I don't recall the number.
17
              What evidence do you have that
18
    these thousands or tens of thousands of
19
    publishers were made aware of Valve's
20
    so-called PMFN?
21
              Any developer who sold with
22
    Steam keys is aware of it. They're aware
23
    explicitly of the content parity
24
    requirement, they're aware of the general
    price parity requirement that's included,
25
```

Page 202 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 and they're aware of the specific price 3 parity requirement with respect to Steam 4 keys, so certainly that group would be 5 included. There is evidence of large 6 7 developers generally being aware of it and 8 acting on it. 9 0. And what is that evidence? 10 It's -- examples of it are cited **A** . 11 throughout the report. And there is also 12 evidence in other documents beyond what's 13 cited in the report of developers asking 14 about price parity, asking if they can 15 sell with a different feature, examples of 16 enforcement or communication from Steam to 17 developers, pointing out what they perceive to be some violation of either 18 19 the price or content parity requirements. 20 So I think the record is replete with 21 evidence that developers in the main knew 22 about this, that Steam communicated it 23 both normally through, for example, the 24 Steam key agreement and informally through 25 e-mails and reports of telephone calls.

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1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
        Q.
              And are you telling me that you
3
    rely on evidence that's not in your report
4
    for these things?
5
              It is evidence that may not be
    cited in footnotes, but it would be
6
7
    included in attachment A2.
              MR. CASPER: Can we have tab
8
9
        twenty-five, please.
10
              I'm going to show you another
11
        exhibit.
12
              This is tab twenty-five and this
13
        will be Exhibit --
14
              THE CONCIERGE: I think it's
15
        seven.
16
              MR. CASPER: -- seven.
17
              (Whereupon, a document entitled
18
        Steamworks Documentation was marked
19
        Schwartz Exhibit 7 for identification.)
20
              Please read them.
        Q.
21
        A .
              (Reviewing).
22
              MR. CASPER: For the record, I've
23
        shown the witness what's been marked
24
        as Exhibit 7, and it is the Steam keys
25
        documentation that appears in the
```

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Page 204
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
        Steamworks documentation on the
        Steamworks website. And one of the
3
4
        subsections is Steam key rules and
5
        quidelines.
              And what I'd like you to focus
6
        0.
7
    on, Dr. Schwartz, now is just the Steam
8
    key rules and quidelines which begin on
9
    page three and go slightly into page five
10
    of Exhibit 7.
11
              MR. LERAY: Counsel, is this the
12
        copy of the rules as they exist as of
13
        today?
14
              MR. CASPER: It is.
              THE WITNESS: (Reviewing).
15
16
              All right.
17
              So the Steam key rules and
        Q.
18
    guidelines that begin on page three, could
19
    you read the first bullet point?
20
              "You should use Steam keys to
        A.
21
    sell your game on other stores in a
22
    similar way to how you sell your game on
23
    Steam. It is important that you don't
24
    give Steam customers a worse deal than
25
    Steam key purchasers".
```

Page 205 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 Q. That's specifically directed to 3 Steam key purchasers; isn't it? **A** . 4 In this document, yes. 5 So a publisher reading this 0. document wouldn't have any way to think 6 7 that it was being asked to price a game 8 not using Steam keys in any particular 9 way; would it? 10 It wouldn't until it looked at 11 the agreement that it was asked to sign 12 before it could get the Steam keys. 13 Q. And you're referring to the user 14 interface that has bullet points that 15 refer to the Steam keys guidelines? 16 I'm referring to a document that 17 has three things that the developer needs 18 to agree that they understand, the first 19 two of which do not mention Steam keys, 20 refer to Steam generally, and the third 21 which does. 22 And they get those when they're 23 being -- they're shown that user interface 24 and they agree to those three points in order to get Steam keys; right? 25

Page 206 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 My understanding is that, in 3 order to get Steam keys, you have to agree 4 to those three understandings, two of 5 which do not apply to Steam keys and one 6 of which does. 7 Well, you said they don't apply Q. 8 to Steam keys. 9 Isn't it fair to say that some 10 users who are applying for Steam keys and 11 who are being asked to agree to those 12 three points will understand that those 13 three points pertain to Steam keys? 14 MR. LERAY: I object to form. 15 THE WITNESS: I think anyone who 16 reads those and reads them carefully 17 would take note of the fact that there 18 are three understandings to which they 19 need to agree. One of them mentions 20 Steam keys explicitly. Two of them do 21 And I think it is a fair reading 22 by a careful developer reviewing that 23 document that the expectation is that 24 the policy that's described in those 25 understandings extends beyond Steam

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- S. Schwartz HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AEO keys. If you have a document that's carefully drafted, one point of which refers explicitly to Steam keys and that two do not, I think it's fair to infer that a careful developer reading that would read them as written. And one provision applies to Steam keys and two apply beyond Steam keys.
- Q. Would you agree with me that some developers who are reading that agreement, which they get in the context of Steam keys, would understand that this only governed Steam keys?

MR. LERAY: I object to form.

Calls for human psychology testimony.

THE WITNESS: I'll stand by my previous answer. I think a careful developer reading that would take the language as written and would see that two of the requirements do not mention Steam keys and would read them as such and one requirement does mention Steam keys and would read it as such and would conclude that the policy that's

Page 208 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 being described in those 3 understandings that they agreed to 4 comply with apply to Steam keys and 5 beyond Steam keys. And some of those careful 6 7 developers presumably would have also read 8 the Steam key rules and guidelines; 9 correct? 10 A. I would not be surprised if they 11 did. 12 And the Steam key rules and 13 guidelines explicitly apply only to Steam 14 keys; correct? 15 I would agree that, within this 16 document, based on my reading here, that 17 the bullet points that talk about this 18 talk only about Steam keys which is not 19 inconsistent with what's in the document 20 that you and I were just talking about a 21 minute ago because that document 22 explicitly refers to Steam keys but it 23 also goes beyond it because it's got two 24 understandings that have nothing to do 25 with Steam keys.

Page 209 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 Q. So I drew from your counsel's 3 objection that you might not be an expert 4 in human psychology. 5 Am I right about that? I would never claim that 6 **A** . 7 expertise beyond having been a parent or 8 still being a parent. 9 Q. So if we want to know what 10 someone reading the Steam keys rules and 11 quidelines or someone reading the three 12 bullet points that we're talking about, if 13 we want to know how they understand them, 14 we really need to ask the person that's 15 reading them; don't we? 16 Well, if we could construct a 17 survey instrument that would be effective 18 in going back in time and capturing 19 people's understandings as of that point 20 in time and not by asking questions that 21 either invite recency bias or are 22 suggestive, either way -- and I'm not sure 23 we could write that survey -- I think the 24 best that we can do is draw reasonable 25 inferences about what conclusions would be

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Page 210
1
     S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO
2
    drawn based on the plain language of the
3
    document.
4
              And that's what you've been
5
    doing here today?
              That's -- I read the document on
6
7
    its face and I think the language is
8
    pretty clear and pretty plain and pretty
9
    understandable.
10
               MR. CASPER: Can we have tab
11
        twenty-three, please. This will be
12
        eight.
13
               (Whereupon, an e-mail dated
14
        July 12, 2013 was marked Schwartz
15
        Exhibit 8 for identification.)
16
               I'm going to give you what's
17
    been marked as Exhibit Number 8. And it's
    an e-mail back from 2013 and it bears the
18
19
    Bates stamp VALVE ANT 00488944.
20
               I'll give you a minute to read
21
    it, if you would, please.
22
        Α.
              (Reviewing).
23
               All right.
24
        Q.
               So this is an e-mail between
25
    Microsoft -- between Valve and Ubisoft
```

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- S. Schwartz HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AEO did you conduct a passthrough study?
- A. I did an analysis of passthrough on Steam in response to the tiered price -- introduction of the tiered price structure.
 - O. In 2018?

- A. The tiered price structure went into effect in 2018.
- Q. And you studied one hundred twenty-four games; correct?
- A. I think it reduced down to that.

 I think it started from a larger number and then, as we made various cuts for various reasons, it came down to that hundred and some-odd.
- Q. And the one hundred twenty-four games that you studied, those are all games that sold more than \$10 million on Steam; correct?
- A. They are all games that crossed over the \$10 million threshold, so they received the benefit of the reduction in the rate when they crossed that threshold.
 - Q. Is that group of one hundred

Page 227 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 twenty-four games a representative sample 3 of the games that are sold on Steam? 4 **A** . I think it is surely not 5 representative of the games that never achieved that level of sales and therefore 6 7 never benefitted from a price change. And 8 it may not be representative of the games 9 that achieved the higher threshold and got 10 the further reduction in rate. I have --11 I would not -- in fact, it is explicitly 12 not a random sample. I have, based on the 13 price changes that I observe, have no 14 reason to think that I can't draw 15 inferences from which I can generalize, 16 but I haven't done a detailed study of the 17 universe of games that crossed that 18 threshold to determine whether they all 19 have the same important characteristics. 20 In paragraph three hundred 21 ninety-five, you report the averages; 22 correct? 23 I report average and median Α. 24 price changes in the narrative and then in 25 figure eight.

Page 249 1 S. Schwartz - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - AEO 2 provides. THE WITNESS: So I've got to 3 push back on your use of the term 4 5 "services Steam provides". 6 Steam operates a business. As 7 part of the business, they agree to do certain -- they agree to allow you to 8 9 play the game. What they do over time 10 is continue to provide the services 11 that they agreed to provide at the 12 time of the transaction. Don't they also enhance the 13 Q. 14 services with new services and better 15 services? 16 MR. LERAY: I object to form. 17 If you understand it, go ahead. I think I do. 18 THE WITNESS: 19 Steam, as I understand it, has 20 from time to time added features to 21 the platform. Whether those features 22 are of value to a particular consumer, 23 whether they are of value to a 24 particular developer, whether they 25 enhance the experience of the user in

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- S. Schwartz HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AEO connection with their consumption of the game or improve the experience for the developer is unclear. They're certainly an assertion that they provide value, but there's no systematic evidence of the value that they apply or that they bring. But it's all part of the base this is what Steam does. These are all table stakes for running a platform business on which people are allowed to play games.
- Q. Does Amazon or Airbnb or VRBO have any long-term obligation over time like Steam does?

MR. LERAY: I object to form.

Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: You call it an obligation. It's just the nature of the business. The transaction is completed in a shorter period of time. That doesn't make -- that doesn't mean that they don't incur costs in facilitating the transaction and